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DICTA

June, 1952

FORMS STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE
PRESENTS SAMPLE CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
The following jury instructions have been approved by the
Forms Standardization Committee of the Colorado Bar Association and their use, in appropriate cases, is recommended. With the
exception of Instructions 15 and 16, all have been approved by
the District Judges Association. Instructions 15 and 16 have been
approved in a recent Supreme Court case.
ROYAL

C. RUBRIGHT,

KENNETH M. WORMWOOD,

General Chairman,
Forms Standardization Committee.

Chairman of Sub-committee
on Civil Jury Instructions.

No. 1
Negligence.
Negligence is the failure to exercise for the protection of
others the care and caution that would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances. The failure
to do what an ordinarily careful and prudent person would have
done under all of the circumstances of the case, or the doing of
something that an ordinarily prudent person would not have done
under all of the circumstances of the case, is negligence.

No. 2
ContributoryNegligence
You are instructed that contributory negligence is such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as helped to produce the injuries
complained of, and without which they would not have occurred.
Such negligence need not have been the sole cause of the injuries,
but merely such that but for the negligence of the plaintiff they
would not have occurred.

No. 3
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is the efficient cause from which an injury
flows, in unbroken sequence without any intervening cause to
break the continuity.
*

*

*

*
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No. 4
Burden of Proof
You are instructed that the mere happening of an accident
does not raise any presumption of negligence.
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in this case to
establish all the material allegations of his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence.
The burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish his
affirmative defense and counterclaim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
By "burden of proof" is meant the obligation resting upon
the party or parties who assert a proposition to establish the
same by a preponderance of the evidence.
By "preponderance of the evidence" is meant that evidence
which is most convincing and satisfactory to you and which you
believe is a truthful account of the matters in controversy between the parties.
In order for you to reach a conclusion that the plaintiff in
this case has proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence,
you must feel satisfied in your minds, after hearing and weighing
all the evidence, that the evidence produced by the plaintiff in
this case outweighs that produced by the defendant.
In order for you to reach a conclusion that the defendant
has proven his affirmative defense or counterclaim, you must feel
satisfied in your minds, after hearing and weighing all the evidence, that the evidence produced by the defendant as to such
affirmative defenses and counterclaim outweighs that produced
by the plaintiff.
No. 5
Unavoidable Accident
The jury is instructed that if you find from the evidence
that the accident was unavoidable, then none of the parties is
entitled to any damages.
An unavoidable accident is one happening suddenly and unexpectedly and without negligence on the part of anyone.

No. 6
Emergency
A party suddenly confronted with an emergency due to no
negligence on his part is not guilty of negligence for an error of
judgment when practically instantaneous action is required.
*

*

*

*
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No. 7
Joint Enterprise
The law is that, if two people riding in an automobile are
engaged in a joint enterprise or joint adventure and both share
in driving, directing, controlling and governing the movements
of the automobile, then the negligence, if any, of the driver is the
negligence of the one riding with the driver.

No. 8
Intoxication
A person is "intoxicated" or is "under the influence of alcoholic liquor" if such person is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to such an extent as to have lost to an appreciable degree
the normal control of his body or mental faculties.

No. 9
Traffic Violation
You are not a liberty to consider the violation of any municipal
ordinance or State Traffic Regulation as negligence unless you
find and believe from a "preponderance of the evidence," as elsewhere defined in these instructions, that the particular violation
of the ordinance or regulation under the circumstances in evidence
was the "proximate cause" of the accident, as elsewhere defined
in these instructions, or materially contributed as a proximate
cause of the accident in this case.

No. 10
Experts
You have heard the testimony of the witnesses who have
given evidence and testified as experts, giving opinions. This
class of testimony is proper and competent concerning matters
involving special knowledge or skill, or experience upon some
subject which is not within the realm of the ordinary experience
of mankind and which requires special research and study to
understand. The law allows those skilled in that special branch
to express their opinions and, upon a hypothetical set of facts
stated to them, say whether or not, according to their experience
and research, a fact may or may not exist. But nevertheless, while
their opinions are allowed to be given, it is entirely within the
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province of the jury to say what weight shall be given to them.
The jurors are not bound by the testimony of the experts; their
testimony is to be canvassed as that of other witnesses, just as
far as their testimony appeals to your judgment, convincing you
of its truth, you should adopt it; but the mere fact that the witnesses were called as experts and gave opinions upon a particular
point, does not necessarily obligate the jury to accept their opinions as to what the facts are in the face of the testimony of witnesses claiming to have actual knowledge of the facts.

No. 11
Preponderance of the Evidenee
A preponderance of the evidence, as mentioned in these instructions, is not alone determined by the number of witnesses
testifying, but also by the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of their testimony and of the evidence generally, and of
these matters you are the sold judges. In determining the weight
to be given to the testimony of the witnesses you should take into
consideration their means of knowledge, strength of memory
and opportunities for observation, as shown by the evidence in
the case; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their statements; the consistency or inconsistency of their testimony; the
motives actuating them, so far as such motives appear from the
evidence in the case; the fact, if it be a fact, that they have been
contradicted by other evidence in the case; their bias, prejudice
or interest, if any has been shown; their manner or demeanor
upon the witness stand and all other facts and circumstances
shown by the evidence, which in your judgment affected the credit
due to them respectively. If, after considering all the evidence,
you find that any witness has wilfully and corruptly testified falsely
to any fact material to the issues in the case, you have a right
to disregard the whole or any part of his or her testimony.

No. 12
Credibility of Witnesses
The court instructs you that you are the sold judges of the
credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given to the
testimony of each witness. In determining the weight to be given
to the testimony of the witnesses you should take into consideration their means of knowledge, strength of memory, and opportunities for observation, as shown by the evidence in the case;
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their statements; the
consistency or inconsistency of their testimony; the motives ac-
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tuating them, so far as such motives appear from the evidence
in the case; the fact, if it be a fact, that they have been contradicted by other evidence in the case; their bias, prejudice or interest, if any has been shown; their manner or demeanor upon
the witness stand, and all other facts and circumstances shown
by the evidence, which in your judgment affect the credit due to
them respectively. If, after considering all the evidence, you find
that any witness has wilfully and corruptly testified falsely to
any fact material to the issues in the case, you have a right to
disregard the whole or any part of his or her testimony.

No. 13
General Instruction
These instructions contain the law that will govern you in
this case, and in determining the facts you should consider only
the evidence given upon trial. Evidence offered at the trial and
rejected by the court and evidence stricken from the record by
order of the court should not be considered by you. The opening
statements and the arguments of counsel and the remarks of the
court and of counsel are not evidence.
The arguments, statements and objections made by counsel
to the court or to each other, and the rulings and orders made
by the court, and the remarks made by the court during the trial
and not directed to you, should not be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.
The court did not by any words uttered during the trial,
and the court does not by these instructions, give or intimate,
or wish to be understood by you as giving or intimating, any
opinions as to what has or has not been proven in this case, nor
as to what are or are not facts in the case.
No single one of these instructions states all the law applicable to the case, but all of these instructions must be taken, read
and considered together, as they are connected with and related
to each other as a whole.

No. 14
Sympathy
Jurors in the trial of a case, such as this one, are apt to
allow their feelings of sympathy on the one side, or their feelings
of prejudice on the other, to induce them to render a verdict
which the law does not consider proper because such a verdict
would be contrary to the law and contrary to the evidence.
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Therefore, you are instructed that you should not be governed or influenced by sympathy for the plaintiff because he was
injured in an accident and you should not be governed or influenced by any prejudice or feeling either in favor or against
the plaintiff, or in favor of or against the defendants, but in
arriving at your verdict in this case you should be governed solely
by the evidence given from the witness stand and the instructions
of the Court.
No. 15
Last Clear Chance No. 1
A plaintiff who has negligently placed himself in a situation
of imminent peril, and is either unconscious of his peril, or unable
to avoid the danger, or both, may nevertheless recover damages
of the defendant who negligently inflicts injury, if the defendant
could have avoided the injury after he discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the plaintiff's peril.

No. 16
Last Clear Chance No. 2
If there was a mere possibility that defendant might have
avoided the accident, and that possibility rests upon split seconds,
this is not enough to meet the rule of Last Clear Chance. Such
circumstances may present a last, but not a clear chance to avoid
the accident. In order for the defendant to be held liable under
the Last Clear Chance theory, you must not only find that he
had the last chance, but the last clear chance, to avoid the accident.

ARTICLE ON CURATIVE STATUTES IS NOW
AVAILABLE
The editor has received many requests for copies of the
article by Percy S. Morris entitled "Curative Statutes of Colorado
Respecting Titles to Real Estate" which appeared in the November and December, 1949, issues of Dicta, Volume XXVI, Numbers
11 and 12.
Our supply of these issues has been exhausted for over two
years and the cost of a further printing has been prohibitive.
Because of the great demand, this article was duplicated and
copies may now be obtained at the Bar Association Office, 702
Midland Savings Building, Denver, at a price of fifty cents each.
These copies, consisting of 36 pages bound in a durable folder,
contain the original article without any attempt at revision.

